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This paper examines the impact of Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA) environmental 
regulations on U.S. motor gasoline import patterns. Following the damage to U.S. petroleum 
refining infrastructure from hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the federal government provided 
temporary relief for several weeks from so-called “boutique fuel” specifications designed to 
improve air quality in certain regions of the country. These temporary waivers increased 
marketers’ ability to sell gasoline originally destined for specific regional markets into a greater 
number of markets. We hypothesize that these same waivers also encouraged gasoline imports 
more than increased prices would have alone. We test our hypothesis using two analyses. The first 
consists of a simple transfer function analysis designed to separate price effects (and thus effects 
of refinery closures) from the effects of regulatory relief. The second analysis consists of a natural 
experiment comparing the primary recipient of regulatory relief — the Gulf Coast gasoline market 
— to the rest of the United States. Both analyses suggest that the CAAA-related specifications 
prevent a substantial amount of gasoline imports from entering the United States under normal 
circumstances.  
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-  -  1Gasoline Content Regulation as a Trade Barrier: Do Boutique Fuels Discourage 
Fuel Imports? 
 
1    Introduction 
This paper examines the relationship between regulations designed to enforce the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA) and motor gasoline imports into the United States. Major 
government studies on the proliferation of so-called “boutique” fuel specifications were 
conducted in both 2001 and 2006 out of concern for their effect on supply chain management in 
times of disruption (EPA, 2001, 2006). Boutique fuels are gasoline formulations designed to 
meet mandated air quality standards. Some of these mandates are federal, from the CAAA, while 
others are state-imposed, from state opt-in provisions of the CAAA or from independent state 
legislation. Economists also have examined the effects of boutique fuel proliferation both on 
long-term prices across segmented, regional markets and on short-term price volatility within 
regional markets. Neither set of studies devote much attention to the role of imports, however. 
Our main hypothesis is that, in some instances, fuel specification regulations on gasoline 
sold in the United States create an artificial market in which imports are lower than they would 
be otherwise and thus domestic refiners are sheltered from international competition. We use two 
different approaches to show that imports played a large role in supplying the United States with 
gasoline following hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the fall of 2005. We are able to divide this 
imports surge into two component parts: that accounted for by higher domestic prices versus that 
accounted for by the environmental waivers issued in the weeks after the hurricanes. The results 
suggest that under normal conditions, regulations and the diversity of fuel specifications prevent 
large amounts of gasoline imports from entering the U.S. market.  
 
2    Background 
-  -  2In a system free of trade barriers, foreign suppliers would be expected to fill domestic 
supply gaps when prices rise. And foreign refiners with comparative advantages, such as 
proximity to inexpensive crude oil, would compete aggressively with U.S. refiners. We do not 
observe such, however, as government regulations have inhibited competition between foreign 
and domestic refiners.  
Competition from gasoline imports has varied during the past three decades. The U.S. 
refining industry changed substantially following President Ronald Reagan’s deregulation of the 
oil production and refining industries in 1981, and the competition from foreign imports even led 
some in industry to call for protection on grounds of national security (Wollstadt, 1985). 
Deregulation caused this pain due to the build-up of small-scale, inefficient refining capacity 
during the 1970s. From 1981 until 1989, domestic refiners’ operating ratios trended gradually 
upward, from a low of 68.6 percent to a peak of 95.5 percent
1, and average refining capacity per 
operating unit also increased markedly. As the domestic refining industry struggled to find its 
competitive footing, the refineries that survived deregulation tended to operate at larger scale and 
to employ more complex technologies (Chen, 2002).  
After Congress passed amendments to the Clean Air Act in December 1990, over the 
next year the EPA conducted analysis and drafted regulations in collaboration with all major 
constituencies except one: foreign refiners (Anderson and Rykowski, 1997). The increasing 
number of fuel specifications mandated by the amended CAAA forced refiners to produce more 
gasoline formulations at lower scale during this period (Yacobucci, 2004). The regulatory 
heterogeneity across jurisdictions in the United States has resulted in different fuel specifications 
in at least fifteen states. ExxonMobil cites 18 different gasoline formulations in the United States 
                                                 
1 Oil & Gas Journal, via Haver Analytics. 
-  -  3in 2002, but the tally can vary depending on how fuel specifications are defined. (Yacobucci, 
2004) In its 2001 “Study of Unique Fuel Blends,” the EPA counted 15 specifications, using a 
broad definition of boutique fuels that includes all local, state and federal programs. Figures 
citing a larger numbers of fuels typically include multiple grades of each fuel type.  
Several private sector and government studies point to varying — but positive — degrees 
of hardship imposed on the industry by regulations associated with the 1990 CAAA. For a 
summary, see U.S. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Majority Staff (2002).The high 
number of non-substitutable fuels creates both financial and logistical impediments for refiners. 
Evidence from regulatory studies and economists suggests that fuel diversity resulting from the 
1990 CAAA results in higher marginal and fixed costs of refining (Meuhlegger, 2006).  
While fuel diversity imposes some costs on domestic refiners, the regulations may also 
benefit domestic refiners by shielding them from foreign competition. Vogel (Vogel, 1997) 
showed that the EPA’s reformulated gasoline requirements placed domestic refiners at an 
advantage over their foreign competitors. Indeed, in a case brought by Petróleos de Venezuela, 
S.A. in 1995, a dispute panel at the World Trade Organization found that the United States had 
violated the principle of equal treatment in Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. The United States revised the disputed policies in 1997, but importers lost ground during 
this period.  
Gasoline imports (finished gasoline plus blending components) generally declined 
between 1989 and 1996, erasing some of the gains made following the 1981 deregulation. After 
constituting about 6 percent of domestic consumption during the mid and late 1980s, imports’ 
share fell and remained below 5 percent until 1996. The slide in blending component imports 
-  -  4ended in 1996, but importers did not see gains in market share until 1999. Since then, gasoline 
imports have risen substantially, to 12 percent in 2005.
2  
Even after the WTO ruling removed regulatory bias, the CAAA regulations could still 
depress imports in two ways. For one, regulations could prevent the sale of imported gasoline 
that does not meet the minimum standards for any U.S. region. Second, the differential 
requirements for “boutique fuels” spread the total gasoline demand among many formulations, 
thereby creating many small markets instead of a single large one. In some cases, gasoline 
cannot even be traded among adjacent counties, and sometimes nearby major metropolitan areas 
use different formulations. (Muelegger, 2006) Further, the frequency of changes to regulatory 
standards present a financial risk, limiting foreign refiners’ capital investment in gasoline 
production for the U.S. market.  
Discussions of gasoline regulations’ impact on trade often focus on the legal aspects of 
environmental rule-making and the interests of foreign refiners (Duncan, 2001). Separately, the 
industrial organization literature demonstrates how the existence of many regional gasoline 
markets can increase barriers to entry and reduce competition, particularly when production is 
disrupted (Muehlegger, 2006). Kumins (Kumins, 2004) notes the challenges faced by foreign 
refiners that might be attracted U.S. prices, but we have not found explicit discussion of the idea 
that fuel diversity could be a trade barrier that restrains competitive forces in the U.S. refining 
sector.  
Brown (Brown, 2006) suggests that regulatory cost-benefit analyses should consider the 
indirect costs of reduced competition in regional markets in addition to accounting for the 
incremental capital costs necessary to produce mandated fuels. According to our analysis, federal 
                                                 
2 Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy. 
-  -  5fuel mandates may reduce competition by funneling foreign imports into several large 
metropolitan gasoline markets. The cohort of countries exporting gasoline to the United States 
following the hurricanes suggests that, in the presence of more uniform fuel standards across the 
country, gasoline exporters are more willing to direct smaller-than-normal increments of fuel to 
the U.S. market in response to price signals.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we examine the circumstances 
of hurricane-related refinery outages and of each gasoline supply component in the weeks before, 
during, and after the emergency. Second, we describe the emergency gasoline waivers issued in 
response to supply disruptions. Next, we formulate and perform two tests (one a natural 
experiment) to measure the degree to which regulatory waivers contributed to increased gasoline 
imports into the U.S. Gulf Coast. The data in this section focus only on the waiver period and the 
weeks immediately before and after the hurricanes. We conclude with some policy 
considerations.  
 
3    Hurricane disruptions and policy responses  
 
3.1    Hurricane-Related Supply Disruptions  
Two powerful hurricanes, Katrina and Rita, hit the U.S. Gulf Coast in late August and 
late September of 2005, respectively. In addition to damaging oil and gas production in the Gulf 
of Mexico, about 70 percent (almost 5 million barrels per day of crude processing capacity) of 
the Gulf Coast’s refining capacity was shut down. In 2004 PADD III
3, the U.S. regulatory region 
that includes the Gulf Coast, was responsible for 43.7 percent of the nation’s finished gasoline 
production and 47.9 percent of total refinery production, so the fall in gasoline production was 
                                                 
3 PADD stands for Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts, which are illustrated in Figure 1. The PADDs 
were developed during World War II for oil allocation purposes. 
-  -  6felt widely in both U.S. and world markets. Our analysis of supply patterns related to the 
hurricanes centers around a 10-week emergency period (August 25 to October 28, 2005) when 
the EPA suspended environmental regulations for gasoline. We also analyze the 10 weeks 
preceding (June 17 to August 19) and the 10 weeks following (November 4 to January 6) the 
emergency period, comparing production, exports, imports, and inventory adjustments during the 
three periods. The relationship between these components is illustrated in Equation (1):  
 
Supply = Production – Exports + Imports – Change in Stocks = Demand           (1) 
 
 
Table 1 summarizes supply behavior, comparing the changes in each component of 
Equation (1) from the pre-emergency period to the emergency period, and from the emergency 
period to the post-emergency period.
4 During the emergency, production dropped an average of 
540,200 barrels per day and an average of 9,860 barrels of net inventory were exhausted daily.
5,6 
Imports were the biggest factor in offsetting this deficit (142,300 barrels per day), and reduced 
exports added 66,100 barrels per day. That is, imports and exports cut the Gulf Coast gasoline 
production deficit by 38.2 percent. Fernandez, Gilmer, and Story (Fernandez et al., 2006) 
provide a detailed description of gasoline import patterns during this period.   
                                                 
4 We made a relatively minor adjustment to the data to include net output of blending components in total 
production. The Department of Energy reports weekly net input of blending components (net output with the 
opposite sign) for the entire United States., but these data are not separated by region, or PADD. We allocated the 
total U.S. figure to PADDs based on the difference between gross refinery inputs and gross output reported for each 
PADD. 
5 Weekly production and inventory data cited here are from the Energy Information Administration but have been 
seasonally adjusted by the authors. Data series cited here for imports, exports and net blending components are too 
small to be seasonally adjusted. Because of seasonal adjustment, totals do not add perfectly in later calculations. 
6 The Energy Information Administration does not report weekly gasoline exports by PADD. It does report monthly 
exports by PADD and weekly exports of total refined products by PADD. The weekly data on refined products were 
used to allocate the monthly export data to individual weeks. 
-  -  7In the rest of the United States, a 217,900 barrel per day increase in gasoline production 
during the emergency was offset by an almost equal increase in inventory accumulation.
7 The 
net increase in gasoline supplies was only 17,100 barrels per day. After the emergency passed, 
much of the apparent increase in Gulf Coast production was offset by inventory buildups, 
increased exports and a big drop in imports. The 344,100 barrel-per-day increase in production 
became a net gasoline supply increase of only 68,700 barrels per day. 
                                                
These supply patterns suggest that gasoline imports were the most important feature of 
the effort to reduce the gasoline shortages along the Gulf Coast after the hurricanes, adding 
142,300 barrels per day to total supplies. Forces influencing the level of imports during the 
emergency included emergency stock releases, environmental waivers, and world price 
differentials, particularly between the United States and Europe.  
Concerned about the impact of the hurricanes on the global prices for gasoline, member 
countries of the International Energy Agency responded to gasoline production losses on the 
U.S. Gulf Coast in a variety of ways. The United States released crude from its Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve. Other countries, particularly in Europe, made more gasoline available by 
limiting additions to their strategic reserves and by making some reserves available for sale on 
the open market. The IEA’s Oil Market Reports from September 9 and October 11, 2005 detail 
these actions. By allowing market mechanisms to allocate these product stock offerings, IEA 
members affected gasoline prices around the world without actually shipping gasoline from their 
emergency reserves directly to the U.S. Gulf Coast. However, since the emergency stocks were 
auctioned on the open market, the role of emergency stock releases of gasoline abroad was 
 
7 In regions other than the Gulf Coast, gasoline was pulled out of inventory before and after the storms, but 
inventories were built at a pace of 43,600 barrels per day during the storms. Building inventories during periods of 
uncertainty — whether the uncertainty stems from weather, mechanical problems or geopolitics — has become a 
common reaction in recent years. One curious result of this hoarding behavior in the face of uncertainty is a 
correlation between high prices and high petroleum inventories, the opposite of what should be expected.  
-  -  8subsumed in the price effects. Consequently, we assume in the rest of this paper that incentives 
for foreign exporters to supply fuel to the United States stem from only two sources: 
environmental waivers and price differentials.  
 
3.2    Environmental waivers 
On September 13, 2005, 15 days after Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, the EPA 
issued temporary waivers on gasoline requirements, with the explicit objective of increasing both 
domestic and international gasoline supply to make up for lost domestic production.
8 This easing 
of restrictions lasted for about two months and was applied differentially across the country. 
PADD III (the most affected area) was the main target, while other regions were only collaterally 
affected.  
The initial set of waivers eliminated Reid Vapor Pressure requirements for summertime 
gasoline.
9 Under normal conditions, summertime RVP requirements end on September 1, except 
in Texas, California, and Arizona. Subsequent waivers removed the RVP requirements even for 
these three states through the end of 2005. Georgia has more stringent sulfur requirements than 
other states, and these requirements were lifted from September 1 through October 24.
10 Both of 
                                                 
8 Waivers addressed regulations related to volatility requirements, Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP), reformulated 
gasoline (RFG), and Texas Low Emission Diesel (TXLED) among others. 
9 Only gaseous hydrocarbons burn, so if the air is cold, the fuel has to be very volatile. But in the summer, a volatile 
fuel can boil, cause vapor lock, and produce high levels of evaporative emissions. As a result, the volatility of fuel is 
adjusted according to altitude and ambient temperature. This volatility change has been performed automatically for 
decades by oil companies, despite minimal public knowledge of the process, and it is one reason that storage of 
gasoline through seasons is not a good idea. Gasoline volatility is being reduced as modern engines, with their fuel 
injection and management systems, can automatically compensate for some of the changes in ambient conditions, 
such as altitude and air temperature, resulting in acceptable drivability using fewer fuel volatility requirements. Reid 
Vapor Pressure (RVP), normally measured in pounds per square inch, is a measure of the front-end volatility of 
gasoline. This is important for starting a carbureted car in cold weather. Summer RVP=7 psi, and winter RVP=13.5 
psi. 
10 Sulfur adversely affects exhaust catalysts and fuel hydrocarbon lead response and also may be emitted as polluting 
sulfur oxides. Leaded gasoline cannot be more than 0.15 percent sulfur by mass, and unleaded gasoline cannot be 
more than 0.10 percent sulfur by mass. Typical U.S. gasoline levels are 0.03 percent sulfur by mass. 
-  -  9these waivers helped create a more uniform U.S. gasoline market, with Texas and Georgia of 
particular importance due to their dependence on Gulf Coast refineries.  
Other waivers offered relief to areas not located on the Gulf Coast but served by Gulf 
Coast refineries through major pipelines. St. Louis on the Explorer Pipeline and Virginia on the 
Colonial Pipeline were both offered a set of staggered waivers, from September 2 to October 26 
in Virginia, and from September 27 to October 27 in Missouri. These waivers allowed 
conventional gasoline to be sold in areas normally designated for reformulated gasoline sales 
only.
11 These waivers were not intended to increase gasoline production in these regions as much 
as they were intended to make gasoline fungible regionally and to simplify production and 
logistics for the Gulf Coast refineries. They also opened up major Gulf Coast pipelines for 
additional import and sale of conventional gasoline. 
Some waivers were aimed more directly at the Gulf Coast, targeting specific cities and 
refineries. The Houston and Dallas areas were offered waivers of reformulated gasoline 
requirements from Sept. 22 to Oct. 30. Also, two Houston-area refineries were targeted to 
produce defined quantities of relatively high-sulfur gasoline.  
With the suspension of specification regulations, the United States imported higher-than-
normal quantities of gasoline from traditional trade partners, but many non-traditional partners 
such as Lithuania, Estonia, India, Latvia, Bulgaria, Peru, Brazil, Chile, and Qatar also sold 
gasoline into the U.S. market during this period. Table 2 shows the sources of gasoline imports 
during the four months around the time of the hurricanes. By comparing imports during August 
                                                 
11 Colonial is the largest-volume pipeline transporter of refined petroleum products in the world, moving an average 
of 80 million gallons of petroleum products each day, through an underground pipeline that stretches from Port 
Arthur, Texas, to Linden, N.J. (New York Harbor area). It supplies products to parts of Louisiana, Alabama, 
Georgia, Tennessee, South Carolina, North Carolina, Maryland, Virginia, and New Jersey. 
-  -  10to the following three months, we see that European suppliers supplied the bulk of the 
incremental imports.  
 
4    Measuring the impact of environmental waivers on gasoline imports 
 
4.1    Transfer function analysis 
Gulf Coast refinery outages and the resulting increase in gasoline spot prices served as a 
substantial incentive for foreign refiners to import gasoline into the United States. This fact 
complicates our effort to measure the impact on imports of environmental waivers alone.  
During the emergency 10-week period, gasoline imports on the Gulf Coast rose by 
152,500 barrels per day, or more than twice the normal level. These additional imports were 
drawn to the U.S. by the high domestic price of gasoline; the difference between the price of 
gasoline in the U.S. and Rotterdam, for example, increased by almost 5.8 cents per gallon during 
the 10-week emergency period. Also, during the 10 week period, environmental waivers opened 
the doors to more conventional gasoline and blending components than would have entered 
under more restrictive clean air rules.    
To formally separate the effects of price incentives and environmental waivers on import 
levels, we estimate the following equation:  
 
yt =  α + Eθt + Σ
l
i=1 βtyt-1 + Σ
L
i=0 δtdt-L + et                         (2)   
 
where: 
= t y  Imports of gasoline to the U.S. Gulf Coast  
= t d  Gasoline price differential between the U.S. Gulf Coast and Rotterdam 
-  -  11θ = t  Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 during the 10 weeks the environmental waivers are in 
effect, zero otherwise. 
Thus, we hypothesize that the weighted average of weekly imports to the Gulf Coast is 
explained by the weighted average of lagged import levels and current plus lagged values of 
gasoline price differentials between the Gulf Coast and the rest of the world. We chose the price 
differential between the U.S. and Rotterdam spot markets because the bulk of incremental 
gasoline product imports were supplied from European firms via market mechanisms. A dummy 
variable is also included for the 10-week period of waivers, to measure the effect of regulatory 
relief.  
Previous researchers have conducted to determine the appropriate lag length in the 
equation (Akaike, 1973; Schwarz, 1978; Ng and Perron, 2001). Testing for up to 12 lags, all 
methods agreed on only one lag for the dependent variable, and all agreed that three or fewer 
lags were needed for the price differential. Tests for autocorrelation were negative.   
We estimated Equation (2) using weekly EIA data from May 2004 to July 2006 for four 
imports series: total gasoline, finished gasoline, conventional and reformulated finished gasoline, 
and blending components. Estimation results are summarized in Table 3. Price has a large and 
highly significant coefficient in the estimated equations for total imports and for blending 
components. Environmental waivers have a statistically significant effect on imports of total 
gasoline, conventional gasoline, and blending components.  
The significance of these results is best illustrated in Table 4. For example, total gasoline 
imports in the emergency period rose from 71,200 barrels per day to 223,700. This increase of 
152,500 barrels per day can be attributed to: (i) environmental waivers (88,180) and (ii) an 
increase in the price differential from the 2.27 cents per gallon that prevailed before and after the 
-  -  12emergency period, to 8.03 during it. The effect of  the U.S.-Rotterdam price differential rising by 
5.76 cents should have resulted in 8.56 x 5.76 x 1000 = 49,306 more imported barrels per day, 
where 8.56 is the estimated coefficient from Table 3. Price and waivers together account for 
137,486 barrels per day, almost all of the emergency increase of 152,500 barrels.  
In sum, this first analysis suggests that the emergency waivers played an important role in 
the large increase in Gulf Coast (PADD III) gasoline imports during the emergency period, 
especially for conventional gasoline. In addition, the results suggest that environmental waivers 
have a larger influence than price differentials on incremental gasoline imports, by a margin of 
three to one. With respect to blending components, price and waivers play a more equal role. 
Over the entire sample period, environmental waivers for total gasoline imports were about twice 
as influential as price incentives. We find that waivers have an even greater influence on imports 
in the next section, which examines only the periods immediately preceding and following the 
emergency. 
 
4.2    Natural Experiment: Difference-in-differences model 
The unusual and volatile circumstances in the gasoline market during the period after the 
hurricanes complicate the effort to measure the distinct effect of environmental waivers on 
imports. We approach this unusual circumstance by performing a natural experiment. Natural 
experiments have gained popularity in economics in recent years, and Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(2000) provide a survey of a particular kind, referred to as “natural natural experiments.” The 
former often depend on group assignments made by policymakers, whereas the latter depend on 
seemingly random events such as the weather to determine the “treatment” group. In either case, 
-  -  13the researcher calculates the difference between groups before the treatment from the difference 
between groups after the treatment (hence, the difference in differences).  
Brown (Brown, 2006) and Muehlegger (Muehlegger, 2006) apply the difference-in-
differences method to examine the CAAA regulations we study here. For these authors, the 
treatment is the presence of regulation; however, in our analysis, the treatment is the temporary 
relief from regulation. In our case, the difference-in-differences approach amounts to subtracting 
the effect of regulatory relief from other phenomena observed in the gasoline market during the 
study period. In our analysis, PADD III is the treatment group, because most of the waivers 
focused on the Gulf Coast markets and markets supplied by product pipelines originating on the 
Gulf Coast. All other PADDs together represent our “control” group. By subtracting the trend 
common to all PADDs across periods, we isolate the specific effect of the regulatory treatment 
on PADD III. 
Difference-in-differences experiments require a counterfactual, the validity of which is 
established by demonstrating that the treatment and control groups have similar time trends. An 
analysis of the weekly data from May 2004 to January 2006 for total gasoline imports and its 
components (reformulated, conventional, and blending components) for the control and 
treatment groups reveals that the two follow similar time trends for the period considered. (See 
Table 5.) 
 
4.2.1    Estimation and interpretation of results of difference-in-differences 
We conduct the analyses with weekly data on conventional gasoline imports for PADD 
III and the rest of the United States. Since the waivers were issued soon after Hurricane Katrina 
passed and were in place for about ten weeks, we analyze imports in 10 week windows before, 
-  -  14during, and after the regulatory relief. We define a dummy for the treatment group, equal to one 
if in the treatment group and zero otherwise. We also define a dummy variable for time, equal to 
one if during the regulatory suspension and zero if before or after the waivers. Formally, our 
difference-in-differences approach is defined as follows: 
 
Yi = β0 + β1treatmenti + β2afteri + β3treatmenti * afteri + β4pricediff + εi                   (3) 
 
where: 
Yi = The natural log of imports into i
th geographic region (PADD III or rest of U.S.) 
treatmenti = Dummy variable, which is 1 if in the treatment group and 0 if in the control group 
afteri = Dummy variable, which is 1 if during treatment and 0 if before or after treatment 
pricediff = Difference between the natural logs of the spot prices for regular motor gasoline on 
the Gulf Coast and New York Harbor markets. 
The price variable included is a control for possible differences between Gulf Coast and 
New York gasoline prices and potential incentives to import into one rather than the other. Thus,  
) ( ) ( Rotterdam NewYork Rotterdam GulfCoast NewYork GulfCoast pricediff − − − = − = . The 
usual difference-in-differences framework assumes that  NewYork GulfCoast = .  
The coefficient of the interaction term β3 gives us the difference in differences estimate of 
the treatment effect and can be interpreted as the average increase in imports in PADD III 
attributed to the waivers. In simple terms, β3 is the difference between of the control and 
treatment groups before and after the waivers. The pricediff variable controls for price 
differences between the Gulf Coast and New York Harbor spot markets, and the coefficient β4 
-  -  15thus represents the incentive of a dollar increase in Gulf Coast regular gasoline relative to the 
counterfactual market.  
Estimates of the parameters for the environmental waivers and price differential in 
Equation (3) are listed in Table 6, along with their respective t-statistics. For four of the five 
series, our results confirm the distinct, significant role played by environmental waivers in 
bringing more gasoline imports into PADD III than would have been the case without the 
waivers. Not surprisingly given the specific federal mandates for reformulated gasoline, we did 
not see a statistically significant import response to the environmental waivers for this product. 
Instead, the response came from conventional gasoline and blending components. As for prices, 
we obtain results significant at a 95 percent confidence interval only for conventional gasoline. 
So, although prices played a role, waivers were the most important factor in increasing imports 
during the emergency period. 
Transforming these results into actual barrels that entered the U.S market due to the 
waivers, we take the before-and-after regulatory relief average of total, finished, and 
conventional gasoline imports, as well as blending components and multiply by the 
corresponding statistically significant environmental waiver coefficient (β3). The results are 
presented in Table 7.
12 
These results suggest that about 130,000 barrels per day of gasoline entered the U.S 
market due to the hurricane waivers. The environmental relief created a short-term 
harmonization that opened the market for gasoline imports and showed that boutique fuels 
represent a barrier to U.S. gasoline trade. It is worth noting that, since the Gulf Coast is a 
relatively small importer of gasoline, with only 9.1 percent of U.S. gasoline imports in 2005, the 
                                                 
12 The number of barrels due to price computer in Table 4 cannot be computed in this framework. The price variable 
here is only a control for New York prices versus Gulf Coast prices. 
-  -  16potential for imports is much larger — perhaps 10 times larger — if comparable regulatory relief 
were offered on a nationwide basis. CAAA regulations therefore keep more gasoline imports out 
of the U.S. market than the 130,000 barrels per day estimated in our analysis.  
 
5    Conclusions 
The arrival of hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the U.S. Gulf Coast marked a period of 
significant turmoil in U.S. and global gasoline markets. In PADD III, reduced exports and 
increased imports were the primary vehicle to offset lost production after the hurricanes, and 
together they made up for almost 40 percent of production losses. Imports added an additional 
152,500 barrels per day to gasoline supplies during the emergency period, and we estimate that 
at most one-third of these imports are attributable to higher prevailing U.S. gasoline prices. The 
rest of the increased level of imports resulted from waivers of environmental restrictions. 
In the opening paragraph of its 2001 study on unique fuel blends, the EPA states that 
CAAA-related clean fuels programs have been an integral part of the nation’s strategy to reduce 
air pollution. At the same time, however, we know that there are periods of supply disruption 
when the lack of fungibility among many blends of gasoline causes delivery problems and price 
spikes.  
Yacobucci (Yacobucci, 2004) provides some discussion of the trade-offs associated with 
fuel content harmonization — including cost, production capacity, supply stability, and air 
quality — and on the importance of how harmonization is defined and implemented in to its 
outcome. The role of imports and their potential to alleviate supply constraints are rarely 
mentioned (if at all) in conjunction with content harmonization and regional supply issues. The 
waivers of 2005 were an extreme measure, but they show the potential for a significant supply 
response to even small changes in restrictions. The harmonization of standards, perhaps 
-  -  17combined with more certainty about the long-term content requirements for U.S. gasoline, could 
allow for significant additions to U.S. supplies through imports, especially during short-term, 
emergency periods of disruption.    
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-  -  20 Table 1 
Contribution of various factors to the change in gasoline supplies during and after the 
emergency (Thousand barrels per day) 
  Gulf Coast  Rest of U.S. 
  Emergency Normal Emergency Normal 
Production -540.2  344.1  217.9  -135.2 
Change in inventory  -9.9  -81.8  -220  72.3 
Imports 142.3  -167.2  19.5  -36.2 
Exports 66.1  -36.5  -0.4  -2.5 
        
Total gasoline supplies  -334.1  68.7  17.1  -102.6 
       
Note: Parts do not add to total due to seasonal adjustment 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Energy Information Administration data. 
 
-  -  21Table 2 
Gasoline imports from groups of countries in Fall 2005 (Thousand barrels) 
  Finished motor gasoline  Blending components 
 Aug  Sept.  Oct.  Nov.  Aug Sept. Oct. Nov. 
“Core” supplier 
countries* 
9,989 9,157 11,437 7,093 3,013 2,727 2,529 1,069 
EU member 
countries 
3,967 8,752 11,853 9,024 8,359 7,370 9,257 7,682 
Non-EU European 
countries 
582  271  1,549  325  695 2,183 2,186 1,287 
Others 1,315  1,147  2,017  1,066 4,372 4,978 4,872 2,524 
TOTAL            
Source: Authors’ tallies from Energy Information Administration data. 
 
*Core countries are Canada, Virgin Islands, and Venezuela 
 
-  -  22Table 3 
Transfer analysis of effects of price and environmental waivers on gasoline imports 
into PADD III 











Total 28.70  0.173  8.56  88.18  0.392 
 (2.44)  (1.85)  (3.30)  (2.98)   
Finished 5.81  0.234  2.42  42.89  0.293 
 (.96)  (2.45)  (1.73)  (2.70)   
 Conventional  8.10  0.092  2.17  41.35  0.207 
 (1.35)  (.093)  (1.55)  (2.66)   
 Reformulated  -0.90  0.211  0.58  6.17  0.376 
 (-0.67)  (2.52)  (1.85)  (1.69)   
Blending Components  25.60  0.080  6.41  47.84  0.321 
 (3.12)  (0.86)  (3.58)  (2.39)   
          
Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient. The price 
coefficient is the sum of the current and lagged coefficients for the price 
differentials, and the test statistics are for the sum. 
 
-  -  23Table 4 
Role of price and waivers in incremental gasoline imports into PADD III during the 
emergency period  




due to waivers 
Estimated change  
due to price 
Total 152,500  88,180  49,306 
Finished 69,100  42,890  13,939 
 Conventional  62,700  41,350  12,499 
 Reformulated  6,400  6,170  3,341 
Blending components  83,400  47,840  36,922 
      
Note: Barrels due to price apply an average price differential of 5.76 cents per gallon in 
the emergency period less the difference prevailing in the 10 weeks before and after the 
hurricanes. 
Note: Changes do not sum due to seasonal adjustment; other components do not sum 
because they are estimates from separate equations. 
 
-  -  24Table 5 
Regression results on a time trend with corresponding p-values: 
 Treatment  Control 
TOTAL  1.335 (0.000)  0.943 (0.107) 
  Reformulated  0.129 (0.113)  0.103 (0.726) 
  Conventional  0.369 (0.028)  0.368 (0.322) 
  Blending Components  0.836 (0.000)  0.471 (0.261) 
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Results of difference-in-differences 
  Environmental waiver 
(β3)    Price differential (β4)   R
2 
Imports          
   Total  1.826**  0.035  0.576 
 (2.16)  (0.65)   
    Finished  2.018*  0.129*  0.720 
 (1.88)  (1.88)   
     Conventional  2.242**  0.192**  0.764 
 (2.09)  (2.80)   
     Reformulated  1.099  -0.072  0.816 
 (1.16)  (-1.20)   
    Blending components  1.363*  0.024  0.503 
 (1.95)  (0.54)   
Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient.  
*Coefficient is statistically significant at the 90-percent confidence level 
**Coefficient is statistically significant at the 95-percent confidence level 
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Role of waivers in gasoline new imports during the emergency period according to difference-
in-differences analysis 
(Thousand barrels per day)   
  Observed change  Due to waivers 
Total 152,500  129,947 
Finished 69,100  35,500 
 Conventional  62,700  27,660 
Blending components  83,400  73,056 
    
 
-  -  27Figure 1 (Source: Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy) 
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